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ABSTRACT: This paper investigates system safety within a control perspective. We adopt model predictive
control for our safety investigation and consider a microgrid system as case study. We study the satisfaction of
consumer demands under different faulty scenarios, and different controllability and observability conditions.
By simulations, we show the feasibility of investigating safety in relation to control properties of the system.
1 INTRODUCTION
Safety is the absence of catastrophic consequences
on the users and the environment (Lussier, Chatila,
Ingrand, Killijian, & Powell 2004). Different aca-
demic and professional communities have addressed
the multi-disciplinary issue of system safety from dif-
ferent points of view. Under a control perspective,
system safety is framed as a control “problem” (Leve-
son 2004), whereby, accidents result from inadequate
control or insufficient enforcement of safety-related
constraints on the development, design, and operation
of the system, leading to their violation and subse-
quently to accidents.
On these premises, the notions of controllability
and observability have been introduced in relation
to the problem of accident causation and prevention
(Bakolas & Saleh 2011). In (Bakolas & Saleh 2011),
for example, the control-theoretic notion of control-
lability has been expanded as the ability of a system
to be brought back to its “safety zone” through in-
puts, and the idea that an accident sequence can be in-
terrupted through appropriate control inputs has been
introduced. Such inputs must be chosen through state
feedback, a process that in many practical applica-
tions requires state estimation and is, thus, contingent
on the system being state-observable (observability is
a central concept in Control Theory). In this view, sys-
tem safety should not be based on output monitoring
but state monitoring/estimation and feedback.
In the present paper, we explore quantitatively the
above perspective, proposing an empirical approach
by numerical simulation to show and investigate the
role and effects of observability and controllability
properties on system safety.
A microgrid system is considered as case study.
Various approaches for energy management within
a microgrid are reported in the literature. For exam-
ple, Jimeno, Anduaga, Oyarzabal, & de Muro (2011),
Kuznetsova, Culver, & Zio (2011), Krause, Beck,
Cherkaoui, Germond, Andersson, & Ernst (2006),
Weidlich & Veit (2008) propose an agent-based mod-
eling approach to model microgrids and to analyze
by simulation the interactions between individual in-
telligent decision-makers. In (Prodan & Zio 2014a),
(Prodan & Zio 2014b), an optimization-based con-
trol approach is developed. For this kind of system,
it is necessary to consider not only exogenous factors
(e.g. wind speed, variations of consumer load, etc),
but also internal dynamics and structural properties
of individual components (e.g. links, storage device,
etc.), which may change due to degradation, failure
and other factors.
We use model predictive control (MPC), which is
a widely used technique in the control community,
to manage the dynamics of systems affected by un-
certainties in the behavior of their components (see,
for instance, (Rawlings & Mayne 2011), (Richalet
& O’Donovan 2009) for basic notions about MPC),
due to its ability to handle control and state con-
straints while offering good performance specifica-
tions. Typically, in MPC, the objective (or cost) func-
tion penalizes deviations of the states and inputs from
their reference values, while the constraints are en-
forced explicitly (Goodwin, Seron, & De Dona 2005).
Recently, MPC is being considered for refrigera-
tion systems (Hovgaard, Larsen, & Jorgensen 2011),
for power production plants (Halvgaard, Poulsen,
Madsen, & Jorgensen 2012), (Edlund, Bendtsen, &
Jørgensen 2011) and transportation networks (Negen-
born, De Schutter, & Hellendoorn 2008).
The proposed MPC framework is used to ana-
lyze various faulty scenarios, whose consequences are
evaluated in terms of consumer power demands not
satisfied. We look at the effects of different conditions
of observability/controllability on “system safety”
(consumer power demands satisfaction).
The original contributions are the following:
• A simulation-based framework for the investiga-
tion of the effects of controllability and observ-
ability properties on system safety.
• The formulation of an optimization-based model
predictive control problem for safety considera-
tions.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes in detail the considered microgrid
system, including the dynamic model, the profiles
characterizing the system, the constraints and the dif-
ferent types of faults analyzed. Section 3 presents the
safety criteria and observability/controllability prop-
erties considered for the system, and the formulation
of the optimization-based control problem. Simula-
tion results for the different faulty scenarios are pre-
sented in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in Section
5.
2 SYSTEM MODELING AND DESCRIPTION
In this section, we present the dynamic models, the
profiles of operation, the constraints and the faults
considered for the components of the microgrid sys-
tem in Figure 1.
2.1 Dynamic models
In the present subsection, we introduce the detailed
dynamic model of the microgrid system, which in-
cludes a local consumer (e.g., large cooling houses), a
renewable generator (e.g., wind turbine) and a storage
facility (e.g., battery). The microgrid is connected to
the external grid via a transformer.
We consider six components, including various
electrical links and the battery operation in Figure 1.
The internal dynamics appearing in the scheme lead
Figure 1: Microgrid
to a 6 components state: 5 describe the power prop-
agation and one, the storage level in the battery ele-
ment.
The state vector containing the information regard-
ing the condition of the system is :
x(t) = [xec(t) xge(t) xgc(t) xgb(t) xbc(t) b(t)]T
The first 5 components of the state denote the
values of energy in the transport wires. We assume
first order dynamics to model how the value at one
end of the wire propagates to the other end. The sixth
state denotes the charge in the storage component.
The dynamic models are given in the following.
External grid to consumer:
xec(t+ 1) = (1− α)xec(t) + αp(t) (1)
Generator to external grid:
xge(t+ 1) = (1− α)xge(t) + αge(t) (2)
Generator to consumer:
xgc(t+ 1) = (1− α)xgc(t) + αgc(t) (3)
Generator to battery:
xgb(t+ 1) = (1− α)xgb(t) + αgb(t) (4)
Battery to consumer:
xbc(t+ 1) = (1− α)xbc(t) + αbc(t) (5)
where α ∈ [0,1] is a fixed constant, mainly dependent
upon the size of the discretization step.
Battery charge:
b(t+ 1) = (1− τ)b(t) + xgb(t)− bc(t) +w(t) (6)
with the mixed-integer conditions (Prodan & Zio
2014a):{
0 ≤ bc(t) ≤ Ma(t),
0 ≤ xgb(t) ≤ M(1− a(t)), (7)
where τ denotes the hourly self-discharge decay and
is equal to 10−4, M represents an appropriately cho-
sen constraint and a(t) ∈ {0,1} is an auxiliary binary
variable, characterizing the battery state of charge:
when a(t) = 1 the battery is in discharge mode, when
a(t) = 0 he battery is in charge mode.
Then, we describe the interactions between the in-
dependent components of the microgrid:
- p(t) ∈ R [W] represents the electrical power
transmitted by the external grid to the consumer,
at time step t.
- ge(t) ∈ R [W] represents the electrical power
transmitted by the renewable generator to exter-
nal grid, at time step t.
- gb(t) ∈ R [W] represents the electrical power
transmitted by the renewable generator to bat-
tery, at time step t.
- gc(t) ∈ R [W] represents the electrical power
transmitted by the renewable generator to con-
sumer, at time step t.
- bc(t) ∈ R [W] represents the electrical power
transmitted by the battery to consumer, at time
step t.
Let u(t) represent the vector of system control in-
puts:
u(t) = [p(t) ge(t) gc(t) gb(t) bc(t)]T
Note that x(t) represent the amount of energy and
the components of the control inputs vector u(t) are
electrical powers, which are multiplied by sampling
time ∆t = 1 hour in the dynamic model equations.
We also assume that five states are available via
sensors. The system outputs vector is made of:
y(t) = [yec(t) yge(t) ygc(t) ybc(t) yb(t)]T
and contains:
- energy received by the consumer from external
grid yec ∈ R [Wh],
- energy received by the external grid from the re-
newable generator yge ∈ R [Wh].
- energy received by the consumer from the re-
newable generator ygc ∈ R [Wh],
- energy received by the consumer from the bat-
tery ybc ∈ R [Wh],
- energy stored in the battery yb ∈ R [Wh].
Further, the microgrid can be described by the fol-
lowing global dynamic model:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
(8)
where
A=

1− α 0 0 0 0 0
0 1− α 0 0 0 0
0 0 1− α 0 0 0
0 0 0 1− α 0 0
0 0 0 0 1− α 0
0 0 0 1 0 1− τ
,
B =

α 0 0 0 0
0 α 0 0 0
0 0 α 0 0
0 0 0 α 0
0 0 0 0 α
0 0 0 0 1
,
C =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

2.2 Profile construction
All the microgrid components are characterized by
certain profiles of reference: consumer load profile
d(t) ∈ R, wind speed profile v(t) ∈ R, from which we
can obtain the generator power profile g(t) ∈ R. The
numerical data is taken from (Grigg, Wong, Albrecht,
Allan, Bhavaraju, Billinton, Chen, Fong, Haddad, &
Kuruganty 1999).
• Consumer load profile
Figure 2 depicts the reference consumer load d(t)
(based on real numerical data coming from a reli-
ability test system (Grigg, Wong, Albrecht, Allan,
Bhavaraju, Billinton, Chen, Fong, Haddad, & Kuru-
ganty 1999)).
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Figure 2: Consumer load profile
• Wind speed and power generator profiles
We also need to specify a profile for the wind power
generator output. This depends directly on the wind
profile v(t), which has to be estimated from meteo-
rological data and information. Figure 3 depicts the
considered wind speed profile.
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Figure 3: Wind speed profile
More precisely, the wind power generated is, then,
given by the following power curve transforma-
tion(Justus, Hargraves, & Yalcin 1976):
g(t) =

0, if v < vci,
Pr · v(t)−vcivr−vci ·∆t, if vci ≤ v(t) < vr,
Pr ·∆t, if vr ≤ v < vco,
0, if v > vco,
(9)
where v(t) [m/s] is the working wind speed at time
step t of 1 hour, vci [m/s], vr [m/s] and vco [m/s] are
the cut-in, rated and cut-off wind speeds, respectively,
and Pr [W] is the rated power of the wind turbine.
Figure 4 depicts the power generator profile with
the numerical data Pr = 6000 W, vci = 3 m/s, vr = 12
m/s, vco = 20 m/s.
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Figure 4: Power generator profile
2.3 Constraints
A number of constraints are set for the different com-
ponents of the microgrid system.
• Satisfaction of consumer power demands
The consumer can take electricity from three sources:
the external grid, the renewable generator and the bat-
tery. Thus, the sum of powers received by the con-
sumer is yec(t) + ygc(t) + ybc(t). We partition the
consumer’s demand into two parts: essential demand
des(t) and nonessential demand dnes(t), respectively.
Therefore, for a safe energy system it is necessary to
ensure that at time t the electricity purchased from
these three sources satisfies the following condition:
des(t)≤ yec(t) + ygc(t) + ybc(t)≤ des(t) + dnes(t)
(10)
• Battery storage
The energy stored in the battery at time t needs to
remain between some bounds, as well as the rate of
the battery charge:
Bmin ≤ b(t) ≤ Bmax, (11)
Dmin ≤ ∆b(t) ≤ Dmax, (12)
where Bmin ∈ R, Bmax ∈ R, Dmin ∈ R, Dmax ∈ R.
• Generator
We consider the limitations on the generator power
taken by the battery, the consumer and the external
grid:
0 ≤ gb(t) + gc(t) + ge(t) ≤ g(t), (13)
with gb(t) ≥ 0, gc(t) ≥ 0, ge(t) ≥ 0.
• Link capacities
We consider the physical limits on the energy trans-
fer:
umin ≤ u(t) ≤ umax, (14)
where u(t) ∈ R.
2.4 Fault description
In the present work, we consider three types of faults,
corresponding to variations of matrix A, B and C in
the system dynamic model (8), respectively:
- Internal faults: faults affecting the internal dy-
namics of the system (i.e. the states), correspond-
ing to variations of matrix A;
- Actuator faults: faults occurring in the control in-
puts, corresponding to variations of matrix B;
- Sensor faults: faults affecting the measurement
of states (i.e. the outputs), corresponding to vari-
ations of matrix C.
3 SAFETY ANALYSIS
3.1 Safety specification
For the purpose of the present safety analysis, we de-
fine that the system is safe if it ensures the satisfaction
of the consumers essential demands. If one of the pre-
viously described fault occurs, the nonessential part
of the consumers demands can be safely cut, while the
essential part must be always covered, as specified in
equation (10).
3.2 Controllability and observability properties
Controllability and observability are two central con-
cepts in Control Theory (Chen 1995). In this work,
we investigate their role and effects on system safety,
as just defined in the previous subsection.
A dynamical system is controllable if, with a suit-
able choice of inputs, it can be driven from any initial
state to any desired final state within finite time, which
is possible if and only if the controllability matrix has
full rank (Kalman 1963):
rank[B AB ... An−1B] = n
where n is the number of states of the system.
This represents the mathematical condition for con-
trollability and it is called Kalman’s controllability
rank condition. Within the system safety perspective,
controllability is the ability to guide a system’s be-
havior towards a desired state through the appropriate
manipulation of a few input variables (Liu, Slotine, &
Baraba´si 2011). Let us consider a system transitioning
from a safe to an unsafe mode of operation due to a
discrete change or event (e.g. failure of a component).
If the system is controllable, there exists at least one
decision/action that could steer the system back to the
safe mode of operation. If, however, the system is not
controllable, there are no guarantees that the system,
having exhibited an accident initiating event, can be
brought back to the “safety zone” in its state-space or
that the accident sequence can be interrupted through
appropriate inputs.
The question is how to choose a control input to
achieve a desired system behavior or a state transi-
tion from an initial state x0 to a final state xf , for en-
suring safety. To achieve this requires full knowledge
of the internal state of the system x at every instance
to the controller/operator, who then compares with an
output feedback. It is, thus, contingent on the system
being state-observable. Observability is a measure of
how well the internal states of the system can be in-
ferred from knowledge of its external outputs. A sys-
tem is said to be observable if, for any possible se-
quence of state and control vectors, the current state
can be determined in finite time using only the out-
puts. The mathematical condition is that the observ-
ability matrix has full rank (Kalman 1963):
rank

C
CA
CA2
...
CAn−1
 = n
3.3 Optimization-based control for system safety
We solve an optimization problem in order to find
the appropriate control inputs that minimize the dif-
ference between the consumer power demanded and
received, subject to a set of constraints and following
the predicted profiles.
The objective function is:
min
[u(t)]t=k:k+Np
k+Np∑
t=k
C(t)
where, C(t) = des(t) + dnes(t) − da(t),da(t) =
yec(t) + ygc(t) + ybc(t), with the set of constraints de-
fined in equations: (7) - (14).
4 SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we proceed with the safety analy-
sis by considering the components faults described
in Section 2 (faults affecting the states, control in-
puts and outputs) and their combinations, and gen-
erating the corresponding faulty scenarios of system
level. For these scenarios, we check the controllabil-
ity/observability properties of the microgrid and ver-
ify the satisfaction of the safety criteria.
The numerical values of the parameters used for the
simulations are presented in Table 1 in Appendix A.
All the simulation results are presented in Table 2 and
Table 3 in Appendix B.
4.1 Fault-free functioning
We first consider the case of nominal functioning, i.e.
fault-free. We verify the observability and controlla-
bility of the system:
rank

C
CA
CA2
...
CAn−1
 = 6
rank[B AB ... An−1B] = 6
Thus, the system is, indeed, observable and control-
lable.
Figure 5 shows the satisfaction of consumer de-
mand, the state evolution and the values of the control
inputs, in the nominal case.
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(b) State evolution
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Figure 5: Fault-free functioning
4.2 Internal fault
The fault considered in this scenario is the total loss
of link capacity. The faulty dynamics of the microgrid
becomes:
x(t+ 1) = Afx(t) +Bu(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
(15)
where Af is equal to matrix A described in (8), ex-
cept that the column corresponding to the faulty link
is [0 0 0 0 0 0]T .
As an example, let us consider the case of a fault
in the link from generator to consumer (i.e. xgc). Both
observability and controllability still hold.
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(b) State evolution
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Figure 6: Internal fault xgc(t)
Figure 6 shows the (non-)satisfaction of consumer
demand, the state evolution and the values of the con-
trol inputs in this faulty scenario. As we can see in
Figure 6(a), the essential demand is not always sat-
isfied throughout the time horizon considered, which
means that safety is not always ensured. And if we
compare the simulation results with the wind power
profile as in Figure 4, we note that periods of de-
mand non-satisfaction correspond to periods where
wind power is very low (near zero). Compared to the
curves in Figures 5(b) and 5(c), we also note that the
values of xbc and bc decrease a lot, while others do not
change much.
For the internal faults xge, xgc and xgb for which the
scenarios are such that safety is not ensured through-
out the time horizon considered (the essential demand
is not always satisfied), the values of xbc (and bc) are
very low compared to nominal case, while the values
of xec do not change much. By comparing the sim-
ulation results with the wind power profile, we can
always find that periods of demand non-satisfaction
correspond to periods where wind power is close to
zero. Then, the power received from the external grid
is not enough to compensate the loss of power trans-
mitted from the battery: thus, the essential demand is
not satisfied during these periods.
From the analysis of this faulty scenario, we would
conclude that observability and controllability are not
sufficient conditions for safety.
4.3 Actuator fault
The faulty dynamics of the microgrid in this sce-
nario in which an actuator is faulty becomes:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bfu(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
(16)
where Bf equals to matrix B described in (8), except
that the column corresponding to the faulty actuator
is [0 0 0 0 0 0]T .
For example, we consider gc(t) (electrical power
transmitted by the renewable generator to consumer)
as the faulty control input. Observability still holds,
while controllability does not due to modification of
matrix B:
rank[Bf ABf ... A
n−1Bf ] = 5
Figure 7 shows the satisfaction of the consumer de-
mand, the state evolution and the values of the control
inputs in this faulty scenario.
From the analysis of this faulty scenario, we would
conclude that controllability is not a necessary condi-
tion for safety.
4.4 Sensor Fault
We now consider the fault in a sensor in the micro-
grid system, such that its measurement drops to zero
and stays there all the time. The faulty dynamics of
the microgrid becomes:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t)
y(t) = Cfx(t)
(17)
where Cf equals to matrix C described in (8) , except
that the column corresponding to the faulty sensor is
[0 0 0 0 0 0].
For example, we consider the measurement of the
link from generator to consumer (i.e. ygc) as the faulty
sensor output, i.e. ygc(t) = 0. Now, the microgrid sys-
tem is still controllable but no longer observable:
rank

Cf
CfA
CfA
2
...
CfA
n−1
 = 5
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Figure 7: Actuator fault gc(t)
Figure 8 shows the satisfaction of consumer de-
mand, the state evolution and the values of the control
inputs in this faulty scenario. The power received by
the consumer is yec + ygc + ybc, which should equal to
the value of xec + xgc + xbc, but in this case it equals
to only xec + xbc. We note that xgc is actually very
high. This means that the consumer receives much
more than what is measured: since the observability
is lost, we cannot have the real information on the in-
ternal conditions of the system.
From the analysis of this faulty scenario, we would
conclude that observability is not a necessary condi-
tion for safety.
4.5 Multi-fault scenarios
Now we consider scenarios where both observabil-
ity and controllability are lost. According to previous
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Figure 8: Sensor fault ygc(t)
simulation results, a single fault does not influence
both of them; thus, we consider the combination of
faults.
By analyzing the matrix A, B and C, we can see
that:
- Single internal faults have no influence on ob-
servability, except for the fault of the links from
the renewable generator to the battery (xgb).
- Single internal faults have no influence on con-
trollability.
- Internal fault of the link from the renewable gen-
erator to the battery (xgb) affects observability.
- If any of the links from the renewable generator
to the battery (xgb) or from the battery to con-
sumer (xbc) or the battery (b) works normally,
controllability holds.
- Any single actuator fault renders the system un-
controllable, but has no influence on observabil-
ity.
- Any single sensor fault renders the system unob-
servable, but has no influence on controllability.
Thus, we consider the following categories of
multi-fault scenarios:
- One actuator fault and one sensor fault - 25 com-
binations
- The internal fault of the link from the renewable
generator to the battery (xgb) and one actuator
fault - 5 combinations
- The internal faults of the link from the renewable
generator to the battery (xgb), the link from the
battery to consumer (xbc) and the battery (b) - 1
combination
The simulation results of the 31 scenarios consid-
ered are presented in Table 3 in Appendix, with refer-
ence to the consequences in terms of safety specifica-
tion satisfaction. Among the 31 scenarios, we have 5
where safety is not satisfied and when a fault occurs
in the battery, the system does not work at all. For the
rest of the scenarios, the consumer demand is satis-
fied. Analogously to the single fault cases, variations
are observed in the values of the states and control in-
puts, which are the consequences of the combinations
of the faults occurred in the multi-fault scenario.
A single actuator fault or sensor fault does not ren-
der the system unsafe (according to our previous sim-
ulation results), and most of their combinations do not
either. But we also notice that the combination of ac-
tuator fault bc and sensor fault yec renders the system
unsafe, because the fault of bc results in no supply
from the battery to the consumer, and the fault of yec
means that the consumer receives nothing from the
external grid, so that, the only source would be the
renewable generator which is not capable to provide
all the power demanded. Besides, the internal fault
of the link from the renewable generator to the bat-
tery (xgb) itself makes the system unsafe; however, its
combination with the actuator fault gb actually keeps
the system safe, because the fault of xgb leads to a
low level of b (the battery) and xbc (energy from bat-
tery to consumer), while the fault of gb leads to the
increase of power in the link from the generator to the
consumer xgc, which compensates the loss from the
battery which was curing the system failure.
From the analysis of these scenarios, we can con-
clude that the loss of both controllability and observ-
ability does not necessarily imply system safety, as
defined in our case study.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have adopted the control perspec-
tive of safety. We have developed a simulation-based
framework of model predictive control for the investi-
gation of the controllability and observability proper-
ties of a microgrid system and their effects on sys-
tem safety. We have implemented an optimization-
based control for safety. Results show that, for this
specific case of the microgrid, different types of
faults have different effects on the system controlla-
bility/observability properties, and on system safety.
We have proved the feasibility of quantitatively inves-
tigating safety in relation to the control properties of
a system. However, based on the results of the case
study, we cannot give conclusive indications on how
controllability and observability (here defined in clas-
sical control theory terms) affect safety, as in some of
the scenarios investigated the fact of having controlla-
bility and observability does not guarantee safety (sat-
isfaction of consumer essential demand) and in some
others safety is achieved even without system control-
lability or observability.
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A NUMERICAL DATA
Table 1: Numerical data for the microgrid components
Battery parameters
τ 13 · 10−4
M 9 · 103
Bmin [Wh] 1.2 · 103
Bmax [Wh] 6 · 103
Dmin [W ] −1.5 · 103
Dmax [W ] 1.5 · 103
Power generator parameters
Pr [W ] 6 · 103
Vcr [m/s] 3
Vr [m/s] 12
Vcv [m/s] 20
Control input constraints
Umin [0 0 0 0 0]
T
Umax [1.2 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.5]
T · 103
Prediction horizon
Np 5
B SIMULATION RESULTS
Table 2: Simulation results for single fault scenarios
No. Faulty Component Observability Controllability Consequences(on safety specifications)
1 Link: external grid to consumer xec Y Y -
2 Link: generator to external grid xge Y Y Not satisfied
3 Link: generator to consumer xgc Y Y Not satisfied
4 Link: generator to the battery xgb Y Y Not satisfied
5 Link: battery to consumer xbc Y Y -
6 Battery b Y Y No supply
7 Actuator: external grid to consumer p Y N -
8 Actuator: generator to external grid ge Y N -
9 Actuator: generator to battery gb Y N -
10 Actuator: generator to consumer gc Y N -
11 Actuator: battery to consumer bc Y N -
12 Sensor: external grid to consumer yec N Y -
13 Sensor: generator to external grid yge N Y -
14 Sensor: generator to consumer ygc N Y -
15 Sensor: battery to consumer ybc N Y -
16 Sensor: battery yb N Y -
Table 3: Simulation results for multi-fault scenarios
No. Faulty Components Observability Controllability Consequences(on safety specifications)
1 Actuator: external grid to consumer pSensor: external grid to consumer yec
N N -
2 Actuator: external grid to consumer pSensor: generator to external grid yge
N N -
3 Actuator: external grid to consumer pSensor: generator to consumer ygc
N N -
4 Actuator: external grid to consumer pSensor: battery to consumer ybc
N N Not satisfied
5 Actuator: external grid to consumer pSensor: battery yb
N N -
6 Actuator: generator to external grid geSensor: external grid to consumer yec
N N -
7 Actuator: generator to external grid geSensor: generator to external grid yge
N N -
8 Actuator: generator to external grid geSensor: generator to consumer ygc
N N -
9 Actuator: generator to external grid geSensor: battery to consumer ybc
N N -
10 Actuator: generator to external grid geSensor: battery yb
N N -
11 Actuator: generator to battery gbSensor: external grid to consumer yec
N N -
12 Actuator: generator to battery gbSensor: generator to external grid yge
N N -
13 Actuator: generator to battery gbSensor: generator to consumer ygc
N N -
14 Actuator: generator to battery gbSensor: battery to consumer ybc
N N -
15 Actuator: generator to battery gbSensor: battery yb
N N -
16 Actuator: generator to consumer gcSensor: external grid to consumer yec
N N -
17 Actuator: generator to consumer gcSensor: generator to external grid yge
N N -
18 Actuator: generator to consumer gcSensor: generator to consumer ygc
N N -
19 Actuator: generator to consumer gcSensor: battery to consumer ybc
N N -
20 Actuator: generator to consumer gcSensor: battery yb
N N -
21 Actuator: battery to consumer bcSensor: external grid to consumer yec
N N -
22 Actuator: battery to consumer bcSensor: generator to external grid yge
N N -
23 Actuator: battery to consumer bcSensor: generator to consumer ygc
N N -
24 Actuator: battery to consumer bcSensor: battery to consumer ybc
N N -
25 Actuator: battery to consumer bcSensor: battery yb
N N -
26 Link: generator to the battery xgbSensor: external grid to consumer yec
N N Not satisfied
27 Link: generator to the battery xgbSensor: generator to external grid yge
N N Not satisfied
28 Link: generator to the battery xgbSensor: generator to consumer ygc
N N Not satisfied
29 Link: generator to the battery xgbSensor: battery to consumer ybc
N N -
30 Link: generator to the battery xgbSensor: battery yb
N N -
31
Link: generator to the battery xgb
Link: battery to consumer xbc
Battery b
N N No supply
